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RECENT CASES
Reaffirmation of the Prohibition of
Agreements Which Restrict Parallel
Imports
Re the Agreement of Ford-Werke AG
(82/628/EEC)
The Treaty of Rome (Treaty), establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), sets forth certain practices in article
85(1) which are prohibited as restraints on competition.1 Article
85(3) tempers the absoluteness of article 85(1) by exempting those
practices when the agreements in question have beneficial effects
which outweigh any adverse effects on the competitive posture of
the parties involved.2 Businesses operating in the EEC, therefore,
have some degree of flexibility in the types of arrangements into
which they enter. In this case, Ford Werke AG (Ford AG) initially
distributed vehicles under an agreement which would have been
exempt from the proscription in article 85(1). The subsequent
change in their agreement, however, brought their conduct within
the prohibited activities of article 85(1), and the European Com-
mission (Commission) took action to prevent any further detri-
mental effect on competition in the EEC. Since the original agree-
ment was acceptable, it remains in force. The Commission struck
down the amendment, however, as violative of article 85(1).
Ford AG supplies vehicles to Ford Britain, a Ford subsidiary
located in the United Kingdom, and to distributors in Germany.3
The German distributorships function under a Main Dealer Agree-
1. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957 II EUR.
COMM. TREATiES B (MB) (in force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as the Treaty], article
85(1).
2. Id. at article 85(3). See also General Note to article 85, supra note 1, at B10-197.
3. Re Agreement of Ford Werke AG, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 256) 20 (1982), 11982]
3 Common Mkt. L. R. 267 (hereinafter cited as Ford Werhe AG]. The decision of the Euro-
pean Commission was appealed to the European Court of Justice. On September 30, 1982,
the European Court of Justice upheld the Commission decision. Case No. 229/82. The Court
had earlier suspended the Commission's interim order to resume delivery of the right hand
drive vehicles on September 6, 1982, but reinstated that order on September 29, 1982.
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ment (MDA) which provides for selection of dealers on the basis of
quality and quantity. The MDA allocates specific territories for the
dealers, who then have a special responsibility for marketing and
sales promotion in their respective areas. Dealers are prohibited
from selling competing products, from selling to dealers outside
the distribution system, and from engaging in certain marketing
activities beyond specified areas.' Clause 2(1) of the MDA provides
for Ford AG to sell to the main dealers and for the main dealers to
sell only to final customers, regardless of their location, and other
authorized dealers. It further provides that "[t]he main dealer may
sell vehicles to his own downstream organisation and to other main
dealers for resale; he may further sell vehicles to dealers resident in
another European Community country and authorised to sell such
vehicles by a group company.... " The MDA defines vehicles as
"the standard specification models of all passenger cars, light com-
mercial vehicles and chassis listed in Annex 1 to this Main Dealer
Agreement." ' The annex lists the commercial names of various
models. The ordinary series production vehicles for right hand
drive come in two versions. One is sold under Ford AG's Visit Eu-
rope Plan and the vehicles are- fitted for left hand drive with the
speedometer marked in miles. The other version is the German
specification model with its speedometer calibrated in kilometers.
The prices to the German dealers for these two versions are the
same with a processing fee added to the price of those sold under
the Visit Europe Plan specifications.' Prior to May 1982, both ver-
sions were equally available to German dealers.
As of May 1982, Ford AG stopped making both versions of the
right hand drive vehicles available to German dealers. Ford Britain
prompted this move because it sold these vehicles at a price higher
than that of the German dealers.8 Ford Britain lost sales to the
German dealers because customers were purchasing cars in Ger-
many and bringing them back to the United Kingdom.
The reason given by Ford AG for terminating sales of the right
hand drive vehicles in Germany involved several considerations.
First, Ford AG wanted to maintain the higher retail prices existing
4. [1982] 3 Common Mkt. L. R. at 269.
5. Id. at 270.
6. Id. at 269.
7. Id. at 270. Specific figures for prices and quantities sold are not available in the
published version of the opinion because of Regulation 17, article 21 regarding nondisclosure
of business secrets. Id. at note 2.
8. Id. at 272.
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in the United Kingdom.9 Second, since the MDA required the Ger-
man dealers to exploit as fully as possible their respective market-
ing areas, by terminating the sale of right hand drive vehicles, Ger-
man dealers would have to consolidate their sales promotion
efforts. 10 Third, because Germany requires only left hand drive ve-
hicles, the right hand drive vehicles are beyond the contemplated
sales range.11 Right hand drive vehicles would still be available but
only through a Ford subsidiary in London. Ford AG argued to the
Commission that "[u]nrestricted parallel imports would bring
heavy losses, notably to Ford Britain."12
Ford AG's initial agreement with its dealers came within the
proscription of article 85(1) which provides:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which
may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market.1 '
In this instance all of the necessary elements are present. An un-
dertaking involves a "cooperative effort between two or more enti-
ties. '' 14 The entities can be either individuals or enterprises. Here,
there is an undertaking between the German dealers and Ford AG,
and there has been an agreement which affects trade between
member states.
Regulation 17 of the Council of the EEC provides that an
agreement which violates article 85(1) may be notified to the Com-
mission for the purpose of exempting that agreement under article
85(3).15 Article 85(3) provides:
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared in-
9. Id. at 274.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 278. Right hand drive vehicles are not, however, illegal in Germany.
12. Id. at 274.
13. Supra note 1.
14. A. Com-ri, TRADING UNDER E.E.C. AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 15 (1977).
15. Council Regulation 17 of February 6, 1962, First Regulation Implementing Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty, [1959-1962] O.J. 87 (1962) at article 5. No agreement may be con-
sidered for exemption under article 85(3) of the Treaty unless it has first been notified to
the Commission. The importance of the Commission's role in the notification process cannot
be overemphasized. The European Court of Justice cannot unilaterally exempt agreements
under article 85(3) of the Treaty. That is within the sole province of the Commission. A.
CROTTI, supra note 14, at 91.
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applicable in the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between under-
takings...
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while al-
lowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which
does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these
objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products
in question."
Ford AG notified its original MDA to the Commission so as to ex-
empt itself from the provisions of article 85(1). The Commission
carried out investigations and decided to initiate proceedings in
July 1982, after the original agreement had been modified. 7 It con-
cluded that Ford AG's original MDA would probably have been
exempt since similar agreements have been found legal.' 8 The
modification, however, violated article 85(1) and was not exempt
under article 85(3). 19
In this case, the problem arose not because of Ford AG's origi-
nal agreement, but instead, because of the modification of the orig-
inal agreement resulting in the termination of the sale of right
hand drive vehicles to German dealers. The Commission analyzed
the situation which resulted from the May 1982 change in the
agreement and decided that the MDA, as modified, came within
article 85(1). In coming to this conclusion, the Commission fol-
lowed its decision in Re The Application of Bayerische Motoren
Werke A.G."0 In the case at bar, however, Ford AG made a unilat-
eral decision to stop supplying its German dealers with right hand
drive vehicles. In BMW, the dealers themselves acted so as to pro-
16. Supra note 2.
17. Supra note 3, at 268.
18. Re the Application of Bayerische Motoren Werke A.G., [1975] O.J. (No. L 29) 1
(1974), [1975] 1 Common Mkt. L. R. D44 [hereinafter cited as BMW]. The Commission
found that BMW's agreement, although within the terms of article 85(1) of the Treaty,
came within the exemption of article 85(3). rd. at paragraphs 23-31. Ford AG's original
MDA contained many provisions similar to those exempted by the Commission in BMW.
See Ford Werke AG, supra note 3, at 276 paras. 28-29.
19. Supra note 3, at 281.
20. BMW, supra note 18.
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hibit certain sales.2 The Commission, however, did not address
this distinction between the two cases. Then, the Commission de-
termined that the agreement did not come within the exemption of
article 85(3) for several reasons. First, neither the distribution nor
the production of Ford vehicles improved.2 Production of vehicles
was apparently unaffected, and distribution was hindered because
the agreement prevented German dealers from competing with
other dealers as they no longer had right hand drive vehicles to
sell. "The practical outcome of Ford AG's unilateral restriction of
the term 'vehicle' in the Main Dealer Agreement is that Ford deal-
ers can no longer compete in those areas of the Common Market
where vehicles are sold with specifications different from the Ger-
man ones . . . . It leads to the sealing-off of markets within the
Community."2 3 Second, since the German dealers could no longer
be fully operational, the Commission concluded that they could no
longer be competitive in their respective marketing territories.24
Third, the Commission ascertained that consumers would be una-
ble to "benefit from price disparities at the retail level."25 There-
fore, the public interest would not be served by exempting Ford
AG's modified MDA.
The Commission found Ford AG's argument that the modified
MDA did not require Ford AG to distribute right hand drive vehi-
cles to German dealers unpersuasive:
It would be incompatible with the very nature of an ex-
emptible distribution system, in which appointed dealers must
be able to compete outside their respective agreed areas, if the
manufacturer were in a position to specify which vehicles the
dealers could sell and in which areas of the Common Market. In
fact, under a distribution system, customers must in principle be
able to obtain from any appointed dealer all types of the manu-
facturer's series-production vehicles on sale within the Commu-
nity. This is particularly pertinent in this case, since Ford AG
manufactures right hand drive vehicles itself and sells them in
the United Kingdom.2
The Commission determined that trade would be appreciably af-
fected because there were dealers willing to export vehicles but
21. Id. at D51-54.
22. Supra note 3, at 276-78.
23. Id. at 277-78.
24. Id. at 278.
25. Id. at 278.
26. Id. at 279.
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who were constrained by the modified MDA. The agreement pre-
vents "cross-border competition in right-hand drive vehicles." ' A
detriment to the public interest was found to exist in that consum-
ers were being "deprived of the advantages of a common mar-
ket. ' " 2 For these reasons, the MDA as amended in May 1982, did
not come within the exemption of article 85(3). The Commission,
therefore, required a return to the situation prior to May 1982.9
The original MDA between Ford AG and its German dealers
contained several provisions which by their very terms violated ar-
ticle 85(1) of the Treaty.3 0 In particular, Clause 5 of the MDA pro-
hibited the dealers from selling competing products. 1 Regulation
67/67, passed in 1967, would, however, grant an exemption for this
particular clause. The dealers were provided with territories in
which they had the sole responsibility for marketing and sales pro-
motion but were not prevented from selling to final customers
outside of their respective territories.3 2 These provisions and the
EEC's reason for allowing them exemplify the purposes underlying
the Treaty.
The Commission recognizes the valid business reasons, not
necessarily anti-competitive, for having sole and exclusive distribu-
torships in the context of vertical agreements.3 3 The Council of Eu-
rope promulgated regulation 19/65 which granted an exemption
under article 85(3) to groups of agreements including distributor-
ships in which only two undertakings are parties and one agrees to
supply only the other certain goods in a given area.34 The Commis-
sion realizes that for many small and medium sized enterprises,
the only way to enter a market is by offering a potential distributor
some type of exclusive arrangement. Regulation 67/67 "re-affirmed
the group exemption for exclusive distributorships . . . and intro-
duced further permissible restrictions on the distributor. For ex-
ample, it would be permissible to require him not to deal in com-
petitive products."" The Commission reasoned that:
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 281.
30. Supra note 3, at 276 paras. 28-29.
31. Id. at 269.
32. Id. at 270. The distributorships were technically not exclusive distributorships be-
cause the manufacturer (Ford AG) was not prevented from selling in those territories. Ford
AG, however, did not sell in those areas in this case.
33. A. CROTTI, supra note 14, at 134-38.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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[i]n the present status of trade, exclusive distributorship agree-
ments in international trade generally result in an improvement
in distribution because an enterprise can concentrate its selling
activities . . . and, since it deals with only a single distributor,
can more easily overcome the marketing difficulties resulting
from linguistic, legal, or other differences. Exclusive distributor-
ship agreements facilitate sales promotion of a product and
make possible a more intensive exploitation of the market and a
continuous supply while at the same time rationalizing
distribution."6
These comments illustrate the pragmatic approach that the Com-
mission has taken in analyzing agreements of undertakings which
have been notified to it.
The instant violation arose because Ford AG crossed the fine
line separating those agreements which would be exempt under ar-
ticle 85(3) 31 and those which would not. Ford AG should have real-
ized that its position was very similar to that of BMW in Re the
Application of Bayerische Motoren Werke A.G.' s Ford AG's origi-
nal agreement stayed within the confines of the BMW agreement
which the Commission had previously determined to be within ar-
ticle 85(3). Ford AG, however, went one step further and stopped
distribution of the right hand drive vehicles to its German dealers.
The effect of this action was to prevent parallel exports. The pro-
motion of parallel imports and exports goes to the very essence of
the purpose underlying the EEC-to promote the free flow of
goods from one member state to another. Although Ford AG did
not violate article 85(1), because its decision to stop supplying
right hand drive vehicles was unilateral, the Commission did not
find this to be an obstacle. It was more concerned with the overall
impact on parallel exports in the Community. In addition, Ford
AG's primary reason for stopping distribution of the right hand
drive vehicles was to maintain the higher retail prices in the
United Kingdom. Ford AG went so far as to argue that if it were
36. Id. at 136-37.
37. Article 85(3), as it would be applied by reference to regulation 67/67.
38. BMW, supra note 18. In a subsequent case involving BMW, it modified its original
agreement which the Commission had upheld. This time, however, the Commission struck
down the modified agreement as violative of article 85(1) and not within the exemption of
article 85(3). The modified agreement there was more akin to a horizontal agreement. It
restricted trade because the BMW dealers could not compete among themselves, and the
result was a restriction of intrabrand competition. 21 O.J. Eus. COMM. (No. L 46) 33 (1978).
Ford AG should have realized that its amended agreement would not be tolerated by the
Commission since its modification was similar in effect to that made by BMW.
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forced to supply the vehicles to the German dealers, it would have
to raise the prices to them. This amounted to an attempt to evade
the Commission's decision since it would have the same effect as
not supplying the vehicles-to discourage parallel exports to the
United Kingdom.
Ford AG also argued that by the terms of the modified MDA
it was not required to supply right hand drive vehicles. Besides the
fact that this argument involved a breach of contract and not the
Treaty, the problem with it was twofold. First, the definitions in
the MDA of "products" and "vehicles" were so broadly drafted
that they could not by their terms exclude right hand drive vehi-
cles.3 9 The Commission found that "[n]o credence can be given to
the assertion that right-hand drive vehicles are fundamentally dif-
ferent from left-hand drive vehicles and that they can no longer be
regarded as 'standard specification models' within the meaning of
clause 1(2) of the Main Dealer Agreement."4 The fact that Ford
AG had previously supplied such vehicles to German dealers was
particularly devastating to their argument. Second, the Commis-
sion determined that if Ford AG's construction of its agreement
were accepted, it could not be exempted under article 85(3) since it
acted to impede the free flow of goods among member states. The
Commission emphasized that consumers must be free to purchase
goods anywhere in the EEC from any appointed dealer.,1
Ford AG also argued that, by terminating the sale of right
hand drive vehicles to German dealers, it "would make the dealers
consolidate their sales promotion efforts in their marketing areas.
They would no longer be enticed away from their real contractual
function." ' In addressing this argument, the Commission noted
that Ford AG was unable to "substantiate any neglect of sales in
39. Clause 1(1) of the MDA defined products to include "all vehicles and original parts
as defined below and the bodies for vehicles included in the company's supply range. The
other goods included in the supply range are the subject of separate agreements, and do not
fall within the definition of products for purposes of this agreement." Supra note 3, at 269.
Clause 1(2) defined vehicles: "Vehicles means the standard specification models of all
passenger cars, light commercial vehicles and chassis listed in Annex 1 to this Main Dealer
Agreement." The Annex listed the commercial names of various models such as Fiesta, Es-
cort, and Taunus. Supra note 3, at 269. Neither of these definitions are narrow enough to
support Ford AG's argument that it was not required by the MDA to supply right hand
drive vehicles to the German dealers.
40. Supra note 3, at 278.
41. Id. at 278-79.
42. Id. at 274.
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dealers' marketing areas resulting from right-hand drive sales."4
In addition, the MDA contained provisions which Ford AG could
utilize in the event dealers failed to fulfill their obligations under
the agreement."" Accordingly, the Commission found no merit in
Ford AG's argument.
Conclusion
Intrabrand competition involves competition among sellers of
the same product. Price differences from one member state to an-
other are very common in the EEC, thereby stimulating intrabrand
competition. The Commission has consistently invalidated agree-
ments where the effect of the agreements is to limit or prohibit
exports and imports. Such agreements, by attempting to impede
the free flow of goods across the borders of member states, infringe
upon the primary goals of the EEC. In the instant situation, Ford
AG's original agreement undertook to provide that all vehicles
were available to all of the dealers as long as the vehicles were
standard specification models.4 5 Since the original agreement acted
to promote free trade, it would have been exempt under article
85(3), in spite of the fact that on its face it violated article 85(1).
Once, however, Ford AG acted to limit exports for the express pur-
pose of maintaining higher retail prices in the United Kingdom, 4'
the agreement could no longer be countenanced. It attempted to
do exactly that which the Treaty prohibited-impede the free flow
of goods between member states.
LISA C. BERRY
43. Id.
44. Clause 6 of the MDA provided Ford AG with the necessary procedures. Id. at 281.
45. Id. at 277.
44. Even without the express purpose of maintaining higher retail prices, the agree-
ment, as modified, would have been struck down since its effect was to limit parallel exports.
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